A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback. / Gneezy, Uri; Gravert, Christina; Saccardo, Silvia; Tausch, Franziska.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 102, 01.03.2017, p. 445-454.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Gneezy, U, Gravert, C, Saccardo, S & Tausch, F 2017, 'A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 102, pp. 445-454. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.008

APA

Gneezy, U., Gravert, C., Saccardo, S., & Tausch, F. (2017). A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback. Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 445-454. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.008

Vancouver

Gneezy U, Gravert C, Saccardo S, Tausch F. A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback. Games and Economic Behavior. 2017 Mar 1;102:445-454. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.008

Author

Gneezy, Uri ; Gravert, Christina ; Saccardo, Silvia ; Tausch, Franziska. / A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2017 ; Vol. 102. pp. 445-454.

Bibtex

@article{808f246f0ca44fd3a2ca5ede4dc219eb,
title = "A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback",
abstract = "We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals, even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedback. However, when feedback is provided anonymously, the aversion to giving negative feedback is reduced.",
keywords = "Feedback, Laboratory experiment, Lying, Overconfidence, Updating",
author = "Uri Gneezy and Christina Gravert and Silvia Saccardo and Franziska Tausch",
year = "2017",
month = mar,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.008",
language = "English",
volume = "102",
pages = "445--454",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback

AU - Gneezy, Uri

AU - Gravert, Christina

AU - Saccardo, Silvia

AU - Tausch, Franziska

PY - 2017/3/1

Y1 - 2017/3/1

N2 - We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals, even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedback. However, when feedback is provided anonymously, the aversion to giving negative feedback is reduced.

AB - We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals, even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedback. However, when feedback is provided anonymously, the aversion to giving negative feedback is reduced.

KW - Feedback

KW - Laboratory experiment

KW - Lying

KW - Overconfidence

KW - Updating

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.008

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.008

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85013994042

VL - 102

SP - 445

EP - 454

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -

ID: 210838532