Limit Pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests
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Limit Pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests. / Schultz, Christian.
I: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Bind 17, Nr. 6, 1999, s. 801-825.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Limit Pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests
AU - Schultz, Christian
N1 - JEL Classification: D43, D82
PY - 1999
Y1 - 1999
N2 - This paper considers entry into a market with two incumbents where one prefers entry and one dislikes it. Unlike the entrant, incumbents know market demand. In separating equilibria incumbents play full information Nash-equilibrium strategies. When beliefs are unprejudiced, separating equilibria only exist if entry is relatively unimportant for an incumbent. In growing markets this condition will tend to be violated so that only pooling equilibria may exist
AB - This paper considers entry into a market with two incumbents where one prefers entry and one dislikes it. Unlike the entrant, incumbents know market demand. In separating equilibria incumbents play full information Nash-equilibrium strategies. When beliefs are unprejudiced, separating equilibria only exist if entry is relatively unimportant for an incumbent. In growing markets this condition will tend to be violated so that only pooling equilibria may exist
U2 - 10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00067-2
DO - 10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00067-2
M3 - Journal article
VL - 17
SP - 801
EP - 825
JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization
JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization
SN - 0167-7187
IS - 6
ER -
ID: 152491