Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability
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Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability. / Andersen, Asger Lau; Lassen, David Dreyer; Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh.
I: PLoS ONE, Bind 15, Nr. 3, e0229789, 02.03.2020.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Irresponsible parties, responsible voters?
T2 - Legislative gridlock and collective accountability
AU - Andersen, Asger Lau
AU - Lassen, David Dreyer
AU - Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh
PY - 2020/3/2
Y1 - 2020/3/2
N2 - Legislative gridlock is a failure of one of the key functions of government: to pass legislation. Can voters counter such political dysfunction? This paper examines whether and how voters hold politicians accountable for gridlock. We focus on the passage of the government budget, the central task of any legislature, and define a legislature to experience budgetary gridlock if it fails to pass the budget on time. We argue, based on evidence from twenty years of budget enactment data, that voters hold state legislators accountable for budget gridlock in US state governments, with gridlocked incumbents losing their seat more often than incumbents passing budgets on time. Based on established theories of party organization in American politics, we develop three competing theoretical hypotheses to guide our understanding of the observed patterns of retrospective voting. We find strong support for collective electoral accountability with voters punishing incumbent members of state legislature majority parties.
AB - Legislative gridlock is a failure of one of the key functions of government: to pass legislation. Can voters counter such political dysfunction? This paper examines whether and how voters hold politicians accountable for gridlock. We focus on the passage of the government budget, the central task of any legislature, and define a legislature to experience budgetary gridlock if it fails to pass the budget on time. We argue, based on evidence from twenty years of budget enactment data, that voters hold state legislators accountable for budget gridlock in US state governments, with gridlocked incumbents losing their seat more often than incumbents passing budgets on time. Based on established theories of party organization in American politics, we develop three competing theoretical hypotheses to guide our understanding of the observed patterns of retrospective voting. We find strong support for collective electoral accountability with voters punishing incumbent members of state legislature majority parties.
U2 - 10.1371/journal.pone.0229789
DO - 10.1371/journal.pone.0229789
M3 - Journal article
C2 - 32119706
VL - 15
JO - PLoS ONE
JF - PLoS ONE
SN - 1932-6203
IS - 3
M1 - e0229789
ER -
ID: 237006188